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IN THE SlJPf<.E!';,fE COURT
OF T'HE STATE OF u-TAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COl\E\IISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

10354

NELTMAN C. PETTY and IREY.A
G. PE TTY, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission, has appealed to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah by virtue of leave to take an interlocutory
appeal from a decision of the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snow, Judge, of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, requiring the appellant to answer interrogatories submitted by the respondents Neuman C.

1

Petty and Ireva G. Petty, and awarding the
respond.
ents the sum of $75 attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN LOlVER COURT
The appellant filed its complaiut to condemn certain property for the purposes of acquiring controlled.
access facilities and public highways on J anuarv 24
. ,
1964. An order of occupancy was granted on January
31, 1964. Various defendants were named to the co~
demnation action. The only parties with which this
appeal is concerned are the defendants Neuman C
Petty and Ireva G. Petty, his wife. The parties filed
an answer to the appellant's complaint on August 19.
1964. On December 24, 1964, the respondents served
a demand for interrogatories upon the appellant. An·
swers to those interrogatories were filed on March 1,
1965. On March 2, 1965, respondents filed objections
to the answers to interrogatories and a motion for
attorney's fees. On l\Iarch 29, 1965, the court below
entered an order, granting respondents attorney's fees
and ordering that the appellant more fully answer the
interrogatories asked by the respondents. An interlocu·
tory appeal was granted on the 29th day of June, 1965.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
. 1 cour.t's
The appellant seeks reversal of the tria

order compelling appellant to answer the interrogatories
posed by the respondents and awarding the respondents
attorney's fees.

2

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The appellant submits the following statement of
fads. In the instant action, appellant sought to acquire
property, in which respondents claimed an interest, for
highway purposes ( H. 1 through 10). The answer filed
by the respondents left in issue only the value of their
interest to Parcel No. 181 :13 described in appellant's
complaint (R. 19).
On December 24<, 1964, the respondents served
interrogatories on appellant. The relevant interroga·tories on contest in this appeal request the following
information:

(
(

"I. Please set forth the names and addresses
of the witnesses plaintiff intends to call at the
time of trial in the abo'\'e captioned case."

"3. Please set forth what you contend to be
the fair value of the taken property and in connection with answering this question, please give
the following values:

a. The value of the land itself.
b. The value of improvements, to wit: the
building.
c. The value of underground impro'bCments
to wit: septic tank, water line and gas line.
d. Y alue of razed building as a whole when
connected to the metal shed which remains.
e. Damage to property as the same '\Vas effected bv reformation of the street and
frontage. taken being irregular in shape and
no longer accessible, if any."

3

"4. 'Vhat does plaintiff contend to be th h' h
est and best use of the propertv which ,,, e ig ·
"as con.
.
. •
d emne d as o f t 1ie time
of service of swumons. ,,

?n 1.Harch ~·

H)()5, the appellant filed answers to the
mt~rr~gator1cs. '~'he appellant'~ ans\vers to Interrogatones 3 and 4 clauned that the mformation sought was
1

privileged and that appellant had no opinion outside
of its expert witnesses as to the highest and best use
of respondents' property.
Objections to the answers to the interrogatories
were filed by respondents (R. 32). The objection to
the answer to Interrogatory No. I was that the addresses of plaintiff's witnesses were not stated. The
objection to the answer to Interrogatory No. 4 was
that it was not answered. The objection to the answer
to Interrogatory No. 3 was that the information sought
was not privileged and that appellant had not timely
objected to the interrogatory. Further, respondents
sought an award of attorney's fees for having to bring
the motion to compel answers.
On March 29, 1965, the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snow ordered appellants to answer respondent's inter·
rogatories and awarded respondents the sum of $75 for
attorney's fees. It is submitted that this order was
erroneous.
.
.
f'l d b Attorney General
The original condemnat10n action was 1 e .{ t' e the demand
A. Pratt Kesler. During the period betwe!!1 t eth~manswers were
for interrogatories was served and the ime d 0 ffice
·
filed, Attorney General Phil L. Hansen assume
1

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERlXG APPELLANT TO ANS,VER RESPONDENT~' INTERROGATORIES WITH GREATER PARTICULARITY.
It is submitted that each of the interrogatories posed
by the respondents, which are relevant to this appeal,
,rere improper and objectionable. Interrogatory No.
J asked the appellant to set forth the names and addres:,es of all witnesses "plaintiff intends to call at the
time of trial * * *." It is well settled that such a question is completely improper.

Interrogatories, under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, are merely a written means of inquiring into matter in the possession of another party.
They are subject to the same limitations as questions
in the taking of a deposition. In Moore's Federal P.·actice, Paragraph 26.19 [4}, it is stated:
"Relative to the second purpose mentioned in
subhead [l} supra, whether a party may be required at a proper time to state the names and
addresses of witnesses then known and which he
proposed to introduce at trial, the weight of reported authority is that a party is not required
so to do."

In Coydill v. Tennessee Valley Authority (E.D.,
Tenn. 1947), 7 :F'.R.D. 411, such a question was held
objectionable and the court stated:
5

" *l

* * If it asks then to commit the 1
.
mse ves
11 1 alfvahnce to duse certam designated witnesses
a 11 o t em
an none .other, that would call,,·
. d
!fl[
an ac t o f. angerous
unprudence
and
't
ll
1
l
'
W001
not be fair to impose such a handicap."
·

Thus, the overwhelming weight of precedent suppor\\
a conclusion that Interrogatory No. 1 posed bv the
respondents is improper. Fidelis Fisheries, Ltd. ,.,
1 1horden, 12 l<-..R.D. 179 ( S.D., New York l9j21
Truck Drivers and Helpers Local v. Grosshans a~~
Peterson, Inc., 209 F.Supp. 161 (D.C., Kan. l9fl2):
:Moore, supra, 26.19[4), pages 1247-1250.
It is further submitted that in spite of the fact that
Interrogatory No. 1 was objectionable, appellant did
substantially answer the question. In the answer semd
by the appellant, three individuals were named and
it was indicated that all were residents of Salt Lake
City. This is undoubtedly sufficient information for
the respondents' needs.
Interrogatory No. 3 requested that the appellant
supply the respondents with certain figures which the
appellant contended to be the fair market value of the
property taken. It is submitted that this question.~
objectionable as calling for information in violation
of Rule 30 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that
it calls for the opinion of appellant's experts and the
work product of appellant's counsel. Rule 30(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

" * * * The court shall not order
the froduc·
· · obtamed or
tion or inspection of any wr1tmg
6

prepared by the adverse party, his attorney,
surety, indenmitor, or agent, in anticipation of
litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection will
unfairly prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection in preparing his claim or
defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice. The court shall not order the production
or inspection of any part of the writing that reflects an attorney's men~al impressions, conclusions. opinions, or legal theories, or, except as
provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an ext "
per.
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

·' * * * The provisions of Rule 30 (b) are applicable for the protection of the party from
whom answers to interrogatories are sought under this rule."
The information sought in the interrogatories
obYiously asked for appraisals made by appellant's
appraisers submitted in appraisal reports to appellant's
counsel. Consequently, to the extent that this information is sought by interrogatories, it is objectionable.
In Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d
224< (1952), this court, as to the limitation on Rule 35,
stated:
"This provision deals only with subjective matters, not with evidence of what the objective
facts, that is occurrences, conditions and circumstances, are, but ,~:ith conclusions from or of
other evidence of such fact or facts which have
personal coloring. It forbids discovery of any
part of a writing which reflects an attorney's

7

mental impressions, conclusions opi'n·
·
.
'
ions or le l
tlieories,
sometimes called the work pro duct ofgaa
a tt·orney, an d the conclusions of an
n
It
pro l11·b·its d"Iscovery .absolutely· of all sucexpert
l1 matters
·
an d t o. t liatS e ff ect. IS. clear ' positive an ll w1'thout·
exception. o the trial court erred in hold' tl
. proI11·b·Ihon
· d oes not applv to expert mg· ·iat
th IS
.J
•
•
oprruon
.
w h~r~ a ?emal would cause prejudice, hardshi
or mJushce."
P
This case is clear precedent against requiring appellant
to answer respondents' Interrogatory No. 3.
The respondents' request in the instant case asks
for not only matters which involve communications
from experts employed by the appellant for the litiga·
tion but information in the possession of counsel. Rule
30 ( b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was drawn
specifically to protect such information from disclosure
in the absence of a showing of "prejudice." Mower!'.
McCarthy, supra. The Utah rule was drawn to be more
protective than the Federal rule. See Compiler's Note,
Rule 30 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah An·
notated, 1953, Vol. 9, page 559-560.
In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the
United States Supreme Court ruled that disclosure of
witnesses' statements obtained for litigation and held
by counsel need not be disclosed. At least three reports
were obtained in the instant case as can be seen from
appellant's answers to Interrogatories l and 2. Inter·
rogatory No. 3 asks for various values and, of neces·
sity, would require an analysis of the three reports.

8
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Obriously, this is an inquiry into the "work product"
of appellant's counsel.
Further, since respo!ldcnt seeks matters of evidence,
m effect, from appellant's experts, communicated to
appellant's counsel, inquiry is sought into the lawyerclient relationship. In Hust v. Roberts, 171 Cal. App.
2d 772, 341 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1959), interrogatories were
.~ougi1t from the State of California in a condemnation
proceeding. The values of the lands condemned were
requested, which information was the subject of reports
from expert appraisers hired by the State. In holding
inquiry was improper, the court observed:
"Interrogatories 6 to 10 deal with appraisals
of the property which have been made by the
State, request the names and addresses of the
appraisers, and the contents of the appraisers'
reports. It appears by affidavits presented to
the trial court that the attorneys for the State
requested the State to employ appraisers to go
upon the property to investigate its nature and
uses, to appraise its value, and to report. It
also appears that these things were done and
that the State communicated the matters reported and delivered the reports to its attorneys
in confidence. The State has claimed that these
matters are privileged under the attorney-client
privilege declared by statute. The claim is good."

In City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halstead Building
Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 143 N.E .. 2d 40 (1957), information concerning the a pp raised value of land in a
condemnation proceeding was sought. In holding the
9

appellant not entitled to the information tl
' ie court
rue
1 d:
"Irrespective of the holding in the St
l d f d
anczak
cas~.' t le e ~n bant wa~ not entitled to the informa ~on soug t. y t 1le .discovery proceedings. The
undisputed evidence 1s that the appra 1'sals
.
· were
ma d e b! t he two witnesses as experts in the real
estat~ field ~t the re~ue~t o.f counsel for plaintiff
for his use m the trial. fh1s being true the e ...
. ·1egecl and need not be 'disclosed
\l
d ence was pr1n
either at time discovery is sought or at the trial."
Further, many courts have ruled that it is inherently unfair to allow a party without expense to obtain
the information held by another. United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98 (D.C., Ga. 1955);
Moore's Federal Practice, Para. 26.24; Friedenthal,

Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stanford Law Review 455, 479 (1962).
It is apparent, therefore, that respondents' questions.
to the extent they seek privileged information and in.
. d f rom experts, are1proper.
i/}'I
receive
f ormabon

Interrogatory No. 4 requests the position of appellant as to the highest and best use of the respondents'
property. This question is equally improper. Not only
does it seek information privileged under Rule 30(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but it goes beyond the
scope of Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
·
· mo
· t f act s and
seeks information that is beyond mqmry
seeks appellant's legal theories. In Rust v. Roberts,
· ·1ar requ est··
supra, the California court answered a slffii

10

"Interrogatories 13 through 19 request that
the State inform petitioners what use it contends
is the highest and best use of the land and as
to the facts upon which such contention is based.
Such matters are not relevant to the issue of
rnlue. being merely arguments and theories that
the State may advance through its witnesses on
rnlue. Indeed, the State may well want to use
a witness with whose theories as to use of the
property the State does not agree. The State's
contentions cannot be put in evidence even
though its expert witnesses will, in all probability, when testifying on value, testify also as
to what is the highest and best use of the property. They will probably also testify as to the
various uses to ·which the property can be put.
But the State's contentions pro or con upon the
subject matter of the interrogatories are not
proper subjects of discov-ery. * * * Evidence
may be given by either party as to the uses to
which the property may be put and answers to
the interrogatories would neither confine petitioners in the scope of their proof nor prevent
the State's witnesses from testifying ~s to a use
which in their opinion is the highest and best
use of the property. 'Ve see no useful purpose
to be served by these interrogatories."

Payer, Hewitt & Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 26 F.R.D.
219 (D.C., Del. 1960), it was observed:

" * * * It is well settled that opinions and legal
conclusions may not be required by interrogatories."
See Moore's Federal Practice, Paragraph 33.17, to the
same effect as respects requests for legal contentions.
11

Further, it is submitted that appellant .
is not pre.
f f .
.
.
se o a a1lure
to ob.Ject to the mterrogatories when thev
. .
. were served.
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Cini Procedure , prov1·des:

.
. .
.
cIu d ed f rom ra1smg its contentions hecau

" * "'···" *· ,V.it I.im

10 da vs after service of · t
·
·
·
m er.
rogatories a partv
mav serve
writte 11 ob'Jee t'ions
· . ·
.
~her~to together '~~th a noh~e of hearing the ob.
Jechons
at the
practicable
.
,_ earliest
.
.
. time · An swers
to mterrogaLor1es to. which ob.Jection is made
sh:ill be deferred uubl the objedions are deter.
mined.''

The rule is written in permissive terms, which would
indicate that objections ought to be raised within 10
days, but that it is not necessarily fatal. Moore, supra,
33.27, notes:
"In addition to the prov1s1on for objections
to interrogatories, which has always been in the
Rule, Rule 33 now contains a provision that 'The
provisions of Rule 30 (b) are applicable for the
protection of the party from whom answers to
interrogatories are sought under this rule.' The
Advisory Committee's Note to the 1946 amend·
ment indicates that this sentence was inserted,
not to limit the scope of discovery under ~ul.e
33 but in an attempt to remove some of the !um·
tations which some courts had placed on the use
of interrogatories. Even before the am~ndme?t,
the courts had •.vide discretion in dealmg with
objections to interrogatories. The amendment.
of the orders
h owever' makes it clear that anv
•
.t
mentioned in Rule 30 (b) may, when appropn~, e.
be made as to interrogatories under Rule 33.

12

It would seem from Moore's statement that the
concept of privilege and work product under Rule
3o(b) is in addition to the objections that might otherwise be raised and that if an answer would be objectionable under Rule 30 ( b), the failure to object within
10 days would not necessarily preclude proper objection. Indeed, if the failure to object within IO days were
to be deemed an absolute waiver, an effective means
will, in many cases, be shown to circumvent the protections of the rule. At least two cases have recognized
that the failure to object to propounded interrogatorie:;
within IO days does not absolutely bar a party from
challenging the request. In Bohlin v. Brass Rail Inc.,
20 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), the court said that
normally objections within the 10-day period would
he required, but thereafter exceptions were noted. The
court stated:

"I am not prepared, however, to hold that the
failure to file objections to interrogatories constitutes a waiver of either the privilege which
plaintiff may have as to reports of his own physician or as to statements of witnesses which have
been obtained by his counsel in the course of
preparation for trial to which defendant would
not be entitled under the rule of Hickman v.
Taylor.
"Plaintiff therefore will not be directed to
comply with that portion of interrogatory 9
which requires her to supply the defendant with
copies of reports and records of her own physicians, nor with the portion of interrogatory 17
which requires directly or by implication dis-

13

closure of statements of witnesses which .
. · l .l>y fp l am~1
· 'ff"
"ere
o bIame<
· s attorney ·m the course
of
preparation or trial and are his work product."
In Ba.rtcr v. Vick, 25 F.R.D. 229 (ED
. ., pa.
1960), the court ruled that the JlermissiYe lai
rru·
' 1M arre
of Hule 33 gives the person who must answer the alt~:.
native of answering or objecting. The court said that
the failure to answer in 10 days would normally he a
waiver, but acknowledged:
"Although we ha\'e determined that defendant
has waived its objections to the interro~atory,
we would hesitate to enforce this waiYer if ,~·e
felt that it would cast an undue burden on defendant or otherwise would be contrary to the
interests of justice. See Cleminsaw v. Bdech Aircraft Corp., supra, and Bohlin v. Brass Rail,
I nc., supra. "
In the instant case, since the interrogatories call
for privileged information, there can be no valid claim
of waiver because of any failure to file objections within
10 days.
Finally, it should be noted that during the time
for filing objections, there was a change of Attorneys
General, and, thus, counsel responsible for the suit.
Certainly, the people of Utah should not be prejudiced
by their choice and a case for equity is apparent. In
addition, to the extent Interrogatory No. 4 seeks legal
conclusions, it wholly exceeds the scope of Rule 33
and should be disallowed.

It is submitted that this court should reverse.

14

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN A'VARDING
RESPONDENTS ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The trial court awarded respondents $75 attorney's
fees for the respondents' obtaining the order compelling
appellant to answer interrogatories. It is submitted
that since in Point I of this brief it is shown that the
appellant's refusal to answer as particularly as respondents would desire is justified, any award of
attorney's fees was improper.
Even if it is determined that the respondents are
entitled to have their interrogatories answered, they
are still not entitled to attorney's fees. Rule 37, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
"Upon the refusal of a deponent to answer
any interrogatory submitted under Rule 31 or
upon the refusal of a party to answer any interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, the proponent of the question may on like notice make like
application for such an order. If the motion is
granted and if the court finds that the refusal
was without substantial justification the court
shall require the refusing party or deponent and
the party or attorney advising the refusal or
either of them to pay the examining party the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney's fees."
It is submitted, however, that this rule may not
be applied to the State of Utah. The State has not
consented to the burden of being required to pay at-

15

torney's .fee.s .or costs. Indeed, R~1le 54(d) (1), l;tah
Rules of C1v1l Procedure, recogmzes this, for it pro.
vides:

;.' * * * Costs against the st~te of Utah, its
ofbcers and ag~nc1es shall be imposed onlv to
the extent perrmtted by law."
·
No law has allowed the imposition of costs or attornev\
·
fees in this case.
This court has consistently ruled that the State wa~
immune from suit where it has not consented. Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 U.2d 100, :349 P.2<l
157 (1960); Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, IO l'.2<l
417, 354 P.2d 105 ( 1960) ; State v. Tedesco, 4 C.2<l
31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955); State Road Commission v.
Parker, 13 U.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 ( 1962). It is submitted that to the extent the court below awarded
attorney's fees, it imposed a monetary judgment against
the State of Utah without its consent. Certainly, by
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this court did
not purport to waive the State's immunity by allowing
attorney's fees to be imposed. To do so would go beyond
the rule-making power of the court and enter the reahn
of substantive legislation and, consequently, be uncon·
stitutional, since Article VI, Section 1, Constitution
of Utah, vests the legislative power in the Legislature
and Article V, Section 1, provides for the separation
of powers between the branches of State government.
Further, the Constitution of Utah, Article YII, Sec·
tion 13, gives the Board of Examiners the power. to
consider claims against the State of Utah, thus mi·

16

i

I

liedlv raising sovereign immunity to a constitutional
In State Road Commission v. Parker, 13
C.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962), it was stated:

~octri~e.

" * * * any drainage of taxpayers' funds by
abolition of the doctrine, is the subject of legislative attention in our tri-partite system of government,-not the courts."
Since the Legislature has not seen fit to allow
recoYery of attorney's fees against the State in this
case, Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should
not be so construed.
CONCLUSION
The instant case presents an attempt by the respondents to obtain privileged information and the
work product of appellant's counsel and experts. The
precedent is clear that such an attempt is not proper
under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
disclosure of such information would be detrimental
and harsh to the appellant's position.
The respondents' award of attorney's fees cannot
stand in the face of the illegality of the requests for
answers to interrogatories and the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. To so allow would open a Pandora's Box
of constitutional issues.
This court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN

Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant
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